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The interpretive route:
From sign to answerability*
HORST RUTHROF
Signs of Research on Signs is more than a research report on ongoing
studies conducted at the Institute of Philosophy of Language (IFL),
founded in 1980 by Augusto Ponzio at the University of Bari, Italy. It is
a rich resource for further study, oﬀering as it does a very large number
of references to semiotic literature both inside and outside of Italy. The
authors, Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio, have also managed to present
in this volume a series of themes from within and related to semiotics that
challenge existing positions and invite further investigation. Because the
volume has been published in the series Semiotische Berichte in Vienna
under the editorship of the Austrian Society for Semiotics, I would also
like to mention the untiring dedication given to semiotic research by this
group and especially by Jeﬀ Bernard and Gloria Withalm.
Although Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio are responsible for
speciﬁc chapters in the book, for simplicity’s sake I will refer throughout
to Petrilli and Ponzio as authors. I take my cue here from Ponzio’s
preface and his Bakhtinian assurance that ‘the word is never one’s own
but rings with the word of the other’ (p. 6). This kind of review is always
in danger of turning into a mere meta-commentary on the researchers’
multi-faceted observations. To minimize this risk, I have combined sec-
tions into larger themes and shrunk the apparatus of references to its
bare bones. At the same time, I want to emphasize that a review article
is no substitute for the real thing and refer the reader to consult Signs
of Research on Signs for the plethora of details missing in this overview.
The book consists of four sections: authors, confrontations, surveys,
and perspectives. But rather than following this order and its many
subdivisions, I want to crystallize a number of recurring themes which,
I believe, best characterize the kind of research conducted by Petrilli
and Ponzio.
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Review articleBefore I do so, allow me to make a few minor critical remarks. It is
inevitable in this kind of collection of essays that the reader will encounter
repetitions and comments that do not all exactly reinforce the same
argument. There are also some minor typographical errors that could
have been avoided that do not, however, detract from the considerable
value of the publication and its overall message. For in spite of the
staggering variety of the research projects brought together in this
volume, there is an underlying conviction, a kind of semiotic ethics, that
informs both the commentary on other research and the substantive
arguments put forward by Petrilli and Ponzio themselves. The common
thread linking the sections of this research report seems to me to be a
post-Marxian, humanistic stance against global, social programming,
from the perspective of what Ponzio calls the ‘interpretive route’, with
an emphasis on otherness, the polylogic and iconic nature of semiosis,
and the inﬁnite web of signs, including those of silence and taciturnity.
To guide the reader (as much as myself) through the rich materials of
Signs of Research on Signs I suggest a number of major and minor themes
that seem to me to capture quite well the ﬂavor of the book. Petrilli
and Ponzio address such questions as linguistic meaning and transla-
tion; the underrated role of iconicity in semiosis; creativity in relation to
Peircean abduction, literary language, silence and taciturnity; otherness
in polylogism, carnival and automatism; ideology from the perspective
of semiotics; and global communication as a threat to community and
answerability. In grouping the book’s observations in this manner
I acknowledge my willful, if not whimsical, style of my procedure. I also
want to declare at the outset the speciﬁc research bias that will char-
acterize both my selection and argument. This could most appropriately
be ﬂagged by reversing Roland Barthes’s claim that nonverbal social signs
are parasitic with respect to verbal language (p. 140). As I suggested
elsewhere, I believe that the reverse is the case. In spite of the indisputable
fact that language is by far our most powerful semiotic system, language
only ever becomes semantic, that is, ‘meaningful’, if it is parasitic on our
nonverbal readings of our environment. In this sense, nonverbal semiosis
is the deep structure of language (Ruthrof 2000: 152).
One theme that looms large throughout Signs of Research on Signs
is the question of linguistic meaning in relation to other sign systems.
Early in the book the topic is approached with reference to the work
of Victoria Welby and her theory of ‘signiﬁcs’, an attempt to escape the
limits of logic, allowing for ‘ethical, aesthetic, and pragmatic dimensions’
of semiosis (p. 9). The choice of author here is deliberate since one of
the declared interests of Petrilli and Ponzio is a rich description of lan-
guage and semiosis in general. In this respect, Welby’s search for an
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persuasive starting point. For example, she invented the signiﬁer ‘sensal’
to describe meaning ‘in its prevalently instinctive aspect’ and in
contradistinction to the term ‘‘‘verbal’’ for speciﬁcally linguistic’ signs
(p. 12). Petrilli and Ponzio highlight her preference for ‘such problems as
the value of the ‘‘ambiguity’’ of words’ and her critical stance in relation
to ‘the role of ‘‘deﬁnition’’ in the determination of meaning’ (p. 13). In
particular, Welby rejected the notion of deﬁnition of linguistic expressions
as a ‘panacea for the reduction of linguistic equivocation’ while conced-
ing the usefulness of deﬁnition for technical languages, ‘because it elimi-
nates the expressive ductility of words’ (p. 14). Not surprisingly, she is
fascinated by such features of natural language as metaphor, analogy,
polysemy, and other ﬁgurative and expressive devices.
Intriguing also is Welby’s terminology of ‘mother sense’ or ‘primal
sense’ as the source of our capacity to signify and interpret as well as of
‘inventiveness, creativity, innovation’ and ‘critique’ (p. 15). This includes
our pragmatic survival strategies. As she writes, ‘it is sheer mother
sense — instinct of intellectual danger — which in you, as in Dewey,
Peirce, and James, call out for pragmatic reaction!’ (p. 15). Welby’s broad
focus on language in which deﬁnition is legitimate and on language that
requires intricate interpretive procedures leads her to stipulate a rising
scale of meaning making acts from ‘sense’ to ‘meaning’ to ‘signiﬁcance’.
What is persuasive about these distinctions is that she does not erect
any logical barriers between them, at least not for natural language;
what remains unsatisfactory, nor is it addressed by Petrilli and Ponzio,
is that she fails to elaborate an argument for the distinction of sense
in natural language and sense in formal languages, such as logic or
mathematics. For it is precisely at the level of sense that what happens
when we use English, Chinese, or Russian is entirely diﬀerent from what
we do when we follow, for instance, Carnap’s instructions in formal
semantics (Ruthrof 1997: 53–76). Similar observations can be made
concerning her spectrum of degrees of ‘similarity’ in natural language
from ‘casual likeness’ to ‘correspondence in each point and in mass or
whole’ (p. 17). Here deﬁnitional certitude for natural-language terms
is made impossible, though we approach formal identity criteria at
the end of her scale.
The discussion of linguistic signs is brought up to date a little later
with reference to Adam Schaﬀ’s ordinary concepts and stereotypes. These
are part of his picture of speech always being ‘more or less ideological,
since it is connected to social praxis’ (p. 48). This looks right, except that
he assumes as a fact that ‘there is no meaning outside natural language
or independent of linguistic signs’. We need to be clear at this point that
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Moreover, it is a stipulation that eliminates nonlanguage beings such
as primates from a meaningful world, which makes it diﬃcult for us
to explain how they can function consistently and learn routines of
survival that clearly require conceptual shortcuts. At the same time, the
assumption of ‘grasp’ being restricted to linguistic signs has a certain
theological ring to it, leaving humans prior to linguistic signiﬁcation in a
muddled universe. This is a most unlikely story. Indeed, only an already
semiotically well-organized social group would ever be likely to proceed
to the economizing matrix of language on top of existing, socially regu-
lated nonverbal readings of the world as well as nonverbal communica-
tion. It would seem that Schaﬀ, like so many theorists of the last century,
sacriﬁced his thinking too readily on the altar of the ‘linguistic turn’.
The next theorist of the linguistic sign addressed by the authors is
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi in whose writing we ﬁnd a useful reminder of
Morris’s concept of the universe of discourse as ‘(1) delimitation of an
area of the Universe which is to be talked about; (2) delimitation of
the language to be used; (3) a combination of the above two’ (p. 92).
Rossi-Landi is also shown to have revived the discussion of the
relationship between semiotics and semantics, rejecting as does Morris
the collapse of semiotics into the ﬁeld of semantics. Such a ‘reductive
identiﬁcation with semantics’ (p. 93) opens up yet another sleeping worry,
the question of the possibility of separating the semantics of natural
language from pragmatics. This is of course at the heart of Morris’s
time-sanctioned triple distinction of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
I have tried to show elsewhere that formal semantics, as in Carnap for
example, is no semantics at all, but always a secondary syntax (Ruthrof
1997: 76–106). Assuming this is the case, it follows that if semantics is
seen in a rich sense, as it should for the purposes of describing natural
languages, then its separation from pragmatics becomes impossible.
Indeed, I have never seen any demonstration of semantics as indepen-
dent from pragmatics outside the domain of formal languages. Or, when
natural language examples are used in a formal argument, their essential
referential and deictic opacities are typically occluded. To look at
language semantically means no more or less than applying linguistic sign
sequences, or syntax, to nonlinguistic phenomena; that is, we anchor them
in social praxis. The stipulated isolation of semantics from pragma-
tics, nonlinguistic ground of language (certainly not merely a Searlean
back-ground) rests on the treatment of natural language phenomena
as a formal sign system. But once we have taken the formal step, we have
turned semantics into syntax. An entire system of scholarship has
inherited this fallacious procedure.
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diﬀerent theoretical approaches. Morris’s tripartition when applied to
formal languages turns into the schema of syntax — secondary syntax
(illegitimately termed semantics) — pragmatics. This means that two
systematically aligned forms of syntax can be applied to another order of
signs, such as the phenomenal world in the form of nonverbal signs.
Importantly, for natural language the Morris formula looks diﬀerent:
syntax-semantics (which is always already a pragmatics).
A valuable contribution of the volume is the account of how French
structuralist semiologie has, during the last decades, been replaced by
a Peircean-inspired semiotics in Italy, a trend that can be observed also
worldwide, as nonverbal forms of communication are beginning to take
center stage. There appears to be two reasons why the Peircean tradition
should be reemerging so powerfully, not only in the writings of Italian
theorists such as Umberto Eco, Susan Petrilli, and Augusto Ponzio.
One has to do with the central importance of iconicity in Peirce’s writ-
ings, a feature that meets a pressing demand in the age of computer
generated imagery; the other reason strikes me to go deeper to the
philosophical principles underlying Peirce’s semiotics. At the same
time, one of the eﬀects of the linguistic imperialism exerted on cultural
description by French structuralism has been a certain impoverish-
ment of philosophical inquiry into signs. The exception here is of course
the poststructuralist work of Deleuze and Guattari and of Derrida.
Handing over language philosophy largely to post-Fregean analytical
philosophy departments certainly has left semiotics without sharp
weapons to defend its best insights. So the return to Peirce makes very
good sense.
Petrilli and Ponzio oﬀer several pathways out of the post-Saussurean
gridlock. One is the route of iconicity, which has no place in the struc-
turalist system of intersyntactic diﬀerential relations or intergrammat-
icality. There is no iconic outside to the structuralist fortress of linguistic
signs, a picture that in recent writings has been further reduced to
the solitary rule of the signiﬁer. In the face of such philosophical and
semiological reductionism, it is timely that Petrilli and Ponzio should
grant iconicity a signiﬁcant role in their book. I will address this theme in
some detail below. The other way out of the syntactic maze is through
the pragmatics of social reality, which is more than yet another set
of linguistic signs, a domain perhaps well described by Foucault’s
exteriority. A third pathway is oﬀered by reference to Bakhtin, dialogism,
‘plurivocality, polylogism, and multivoicedness’ opening up ‘new and
diﬀerent situational contexts’ with the promise of allowing for a high
degree of ‘semantic ﬂexibility’ (p. 97).
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the important diﬀerence between the kind of ‘unlimited semiosis’ we
ﬁnd in Peirce and, in a somewhat more restricted form, in Eco, on the
one hand, and the ‘inﬁnite deferral’ and hence inﬁnite semantic drift
advocated by Jacques Derrida, on the other (p. 99). What controls
unlimited semiosis in both Peirce and Eco is the set of constraints
indirectly exerted on individual sign performance by the community
through ‘habit’, giving signiﬁcation ‘the intersubjective character of
interpretation’. Petrilli and Ponzio further qualify the notion of
‘unlimited semiosis’ by the Bakhtinian emphasis on the dialogic nature
of all language. Hence ‘the relationship between all interpretants is
essentially dialogic’ and ‘an interpretant sign cannot impose itself
arbitrarily on the interpreted sign’ (p. 100).
What is often forgotten in all this is that Peirce and Derrida have
both reworked a theme that Kant addresses at the end of the Critique of
Pure Reason and in much of the Critique of Judgment. The reason for
recollecting this here is twofold. On the one hand we can observe an
unnecessary tendency in semiotics to understate Peirce’s debt to Kant;
on the other, there is the rarely mentioned fact that Derrida’s entire
critique of conceptuality rests squarely on the following Kantian prin-
ciples: ‘the limits of the concept are never assured’ and ‘the complete-
ness of the analysis of my concept is always in doubt’ (Kant 1965). If
our conceptual boundaries are negotiatory rather than ﬁxed, as they are
in stipulated or formal concepts, then semantic drift is a necessary
consequence laterally, so to speak; and if, as Kant points out, our analyses
of our concepts have no end, then inﬁnite semiosis is likewise a necessary
consequence in the direction of more and more textual exploration.
On the other hand, Critique adds to this fundamental insight the macro-
structural, interpretive consequences of changing stipulated frames
(Kant’s teleological dynamics vs. Aristotle’s telos) that characterize
judgments as a complex process as well as a procedure in need of constant
revision (reﬂective reason) and his insistence on the involvement of the
community in individual acts of judging. Clearly, Peirce and Eco are
closer to the Kantian picture, since they acknowledge the role of sensus
communis, without which Kant’s subjective universality collapses into the
merely subjective, where interpretation loses its social validity. Having
abandoned the social frame in his presentation of ‘inﬁnite deferral’,
Derrida by contrast struggles to recover an ethical dimension
for deconstructive textuality.
One of the motivations for Petrilli and Ponzio to highlight the notion
of community-guided form of inﬁnite semiosis is that they want to argue
against any reductive approach to the description of natural language
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the general heading of the richness of language or, as they put it, the
importance of the ‘unsaid, its capacity for vagueness, ambiguity, inscru-
tability, concealment, reticence, allusion, illusion, implication, simulation,
imitation, pretense, semantic pliancy, polysemy, polylogism, pluri-
lingualism, alterity’ (pp. 133–134). Here the reader feels that we are
getting close to the heart of the authors’ convictions of what makes
natural language tick. No doubt, they are right in insisting that these
issues demand an approach via language philosophy. This is especially
so when what they mean by the richness of language is shored up by
arguing ‘the verbal sign’ to be a ‘historico-social event’ (p. 135). Quoting
Rossi-Landi, Petrilli and Ponzio want to invoke ‘the sum total of
economic, social and cultural conditions’ such that ‘what we describe
as linguistic is, if anything, a part of their phenomenology’ (p. 135).
One could pursue further the problem that if ‘semantico-ideological
pliancy’ can function as a summary formula for the signiﬁcatory richness
of natural language, then how are we to address the basic deﬁnition of
linguistic sense? For only a rich description of this troublesome sig-
niﬁer will be able to account for all the complexities heaped so far on
the linguistic sign. Nor is it persuasive to argue that complexity emerges
from the simple starting point of sense by way of a vast network of
combinations. The combinatory complexity of chess will never amount to
anything like the level of linguistic complexity celebrated by Petrilli and
Ponzio. What then of sense? Throughout the book sense turns up in
diﬀerent guises, from the sense of words to the ‘actual sense’ of an entire
utterance (p. 134). What is missing is an argument demonstrating that
and why the deﬁnitional sense of formal signs cannot carry the cultural
weight shouldered by the sense of expressions of natural languages. If this
is correct, as I have argued in detail elsewhere, then the signiﬁer ‘sense’
stands in for at least two incompatible signs, one that is entirely controlled
and ‘conceptually exhausted’ by its deﬁnition (such as the sense ‘x’ in the
equation ‘x~y64’); the other, in which the process of meaning-making
or meaning endowment is an imaginative verbal and nonverbal explora-
tion within constraints sanctioned by a semiotic community (such as
the sense of human rights). It is at this point that Peirce’s insights of the
necessary translation of every sign into a more developed sign, inﬁnite
semiosis, and iconicity provide us with tools for the distinction. Although
the deﬁnition of the formal example is a sign translation, the translation
process is terminated within the deﬁnition itself. The opposite holds
for the linguistic sign. While iconicity is a possible addition to but not a
necessary feature of formal sense, in the linguistic sign, as I shall argue
later in support of Petrilli and Ponzio, it is an essential ingredient. There
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path we choose, without a clear and carefully argued diﬀerentiation
between these two kinds of sense, we cannot persuasively articulate the
complexity of the linguistic sign.
Nowhere is the richness of natural language better demonstrated than
in the domain of translation. So it does not come as much of a surprise
that translation should occupy a signiﬁcant place in Petrilli and Ponzio’s
book, as well as in some of their more recent publications. Translation
is understood by the authors in the general Peircean sense of meaning
as translation into another sign. Translations between natural lan-
guages then are special instances of the general principle of translation
as semiotic transformation. ‘Semiosis is a translation-interpretation
process’ whereby any sign ‘subsists only in relations of reciprocal trans-
lation and substitution among signs with respect to which the original
sign is never given autonomously and antecedently’ (pp. 127–128). Ponzio
reformulates the Peircean position in terms of ‘replaceability as a
necessary condition of signness’ (p. 128).
From this perspective, the authors review the compatible thinking of
Victoria Welby who links the principle of translation to the acquisition
of empirical knowledge: ‘The more varied and rich our employment of
signs _ the greater our power of inter-relating, inter-translating, various
phases of thought, and thus of coming closer and closer to the nature
of things in the sense of starting points for the acquisition of fresh
knowledge, new truth’ (p. 127). This reminds the reader of Peirce’s
deﬁnition of truth as a limiting case, restricted to the unattainable grasp of
the universe as a whole. A less compatible theorist is Roman Jakobson
whose diﬀerentiation of three kinds of translation has been highly
inﬂuential to this day (e.g. Banting 1992: 240). To abbreviate, intralingual
translation or rewording is distinguished from interlingual translation
or translation proper, both of which are separated from intersemiotic
translation or translation from one sign system into another. Petrilli and
Ponzio emphasize the fact that Jakobson’s three categories are always
interrelated in practice and that symbolicity, indexicality, and iconicity
play a part in all three. What they fail to observe is something that
separates their approach from the Jakobsonian, structuralist position
and that is the fact that for Jakobson the diﬀerent sign domains mean by
themselves. Although a poem can be translated into a statue, a novel into
ﬁlm, a painting into language, these intersemiotic translations are can
rules rather than must rules. Language in Jakobson does not have to be
translated into a painting to achieve meaning. If translated in this way
we have produced additional meanings, a further enrichment of what we
already understand by dealing with language itself. This is part of the
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draw the radical insights from Peirce, then we should say that language
on its own has no meaning at all; it requires other sign systems to
be semantic-pragmatic, such as iconic signs, as a sine qua non (Ruthrof
1997, 2000).
Perhaps Petrilli and Ponzio understate their case when they say that
‘in interlingual translation, iconicity, or the iconic relation between a sign
and its interpretant, is present as well’, only to sharpen their position by
qualifying that ‘this relation is fundamental for without it the sense of
discourse could not be rendered’ (p. 132). Having said this, the authors
might also have suggested that the consequences of this claim are
considerable. At the very least it requires an iconic, quasi-perceptual
approach to the description of natural language, which would qualify
symbolicity and indexicality as secondary, even if vital, functions. It seems
that the authors are not prepared at this point to radicalize the Peircean
paradigm, in the face of their own arguments that invite precisely such
a move.
This criticism ﬁnds support in an illustration drawn from Marx’s sixth
thesis on Feuerbach. Marx uses the expression ‘das menschliche Wesen’
rather than ‘das Wesen des Menschen’. Petrilli and Ponzio show the havoc
this has caused in translations into various languages only to conclude
that it is German grammar that allows us to get it right. The correct
translation is achieved by ‘appealing to the rules of German syntax’. The
adjectival construction ‘menschliche Wesen’ tells us that we are dealing
with the human being, while the genitive construction ‘das Wesen des
Menschen’ indicates that what is meant is ‘the essence of the human
being’, the latter suggesting an illegitimate idealist reading. However,
such an appeal to the syntax of similar phrasings does no more than to
repeat the initial problem, itself not resolved by syntax, that is, how
to understand, that is interpret, das menschliche Wesen in German. It is
not the linguistic sense, deﬁned for us in the dictionary, another syntax,
that guides us, but rather the habitual way we have learned to imagine
‘the appropriate world’ in relation to a linguistic expression. Native
speakers would not make the mistakes listed, not primarily because of
their superior grasp of syntax, but of their naturalized way of imagining
a certain kind of iconicity rather than another one, for example, the one
they have learned to activate in response to the signiﬁers das Wesen des
Menschen. It is this process of naturalization, which we abbreviate by
pointing to syntax. Yet the syntax of a natural language is the eﬀect of
this process rather than its cause (pp. 136–138).
Petrilli and Ponzio, however, have another motive for pursuing the
question of translation in relation to the chosen quotation. They want
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to the relation between meaning and ‘ideological sense’. The authors
formulate this as the double problem of ‘correctly interpreting the
ideology expressed in the text’ and ‘the ideological stance that the
interpreter-translator chooses to take toward the text’, a problem that
highlights the need for a theorization of translation and ideology in
semiotic terms (p. 139), including iconic signs.
What has become clear so far is that no matter which topic the book
addresses, iconicity looms large, and for good reasons. From references
to Welby’s notion of ‘sensifying’, which strongly recalls ‘the world of
the senses’ and her ‘abundant use of images’ (p. 13) to the idea of
‘encounter’ in storytelling on the concluding page (p. 158) Petrilli and
Ponzio return the reader to the theme of the Peircean icon. Why do they
share Peirce’s conviction that ultimately human understanding requires
the translations of signs into iconicity?
A number of explanations oﬀer themselves as we peruse the book.
One is the authors’ preference for a rich description of linguistic mean-
ing over deﬁnitional and propositional certitude. Though icons can be
translated into a set of propositions and we can construe icons to suit
propositions, iconicity, and propositionality belong to two entirely
diﬀerent sign systems. However, if a case can be made for natural
language requiring iconicity to become semantic (in the pragmatic sense)
then the authors are right in giving icons the prevalence they are. It seems
to me that behind the ongoing research by Petrilli and Ponzio, which
continues to address questions of the philosophy of language, there lurks
an iconic theory of language and meaning worth expounding in its own
right. A second reason for their return to iconicity is a liking for those
rich areas of language that are largely concealed in the dominant theories
of metaphor and other ﬁgures of speech, although the book does not
spend much time on such issues. Lastly, there is the importance the
authors place on social context, ideology, and community, all of which
demand nonverbal realizations on the part of the language user to become
meaningful beyond linguistic abstraction.
For Petrilli and Ponzio ‘iconicity implies that the relation between
a sign and its object is not wholly established by rules and a code, as in the
case of symbols, does not preexist with respect to the code, as in the case
of indexes, but rather is invented freely and creatively by the interpretant’
(p. 133). While they say this in the context of translation, this will also
do as a general schema. Perhaps one could query the assumption that the
main characteristic of iconicity is freedom of invention. My suspicion is
that the vast majority of iconic constructions, from the felt presence of
the mother in early infancy to the most elaborate social phenomena and
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of which we are a part. Even our fantasy extensions of ordinary repre-
sentations are by no means as free as we tend to believe. Why else is it
so hard for artists to break through to new forms? What is it they have
to break through if not the social constraints that delimit our iconic
conﬁgurations?
Petrilli and Ponzio are of course right when they foreground iconicity
as essential to translation. For, as I have suggested before, the all-
important thing in interlingual translation is to be able to imagine the
appropriate situation, including a suitable deictic picture, of which the
text is a linguistic summary. Their discussion of icons, however, is not
entirely without hitches. At one point Petrilli and Ponzio introduce
Welby’s seminal insight that ‘while language itself is a symbolic system
its method is mainly pictorial’ (p. 128). This is not pursued in terms
of the description of linguistic meaning but rather with reference to
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the relationship between proposition and
representation. What is missing is the observation that the Tractatus,
as Wittgenstein himself conceded later on, is not a good analogy of
natural language. While propositions in their formal character are
made to signify within a network of strictly deﬁned terms, thus forming
a syntactic web much like a game of chess, natural language cannot
function at the syntactic level as language. This is a crucial and often
neglected diﬀerence. While the minimal or formal propositions
Wittgenstein pursued during the ‘picture theory’ stage of his career can
be embellished by representative functions, natural language representa-
tions are anything but embellishments: they are their main purpose. To
simplify, Frege’s Abendstern always already has a representative func-
tion quite apart from its speciﬁc reference to Venus. Without our iconic
grasp of typical evenings and planets in the sky we could not even begin
to understand the term. What Searle understates as the ‘background’
of natural language is in reality its massive nonverbal deep structure,
without which meaning could not occur (Searle 1983: 145–146).
Another path of pointing to the same problem is to analyze
Wittgenstein’s observation that ‘to know a proposition’ is ‘to know the
situation it represents’ (p. 129). Applied to natural language, this turns
into a crucially deﬁcient description. Instead, it should read ‘to know
a sentence of a natural language is to be able to imagine the situa-
tion it represents and the utterance situation of which it is a part’.
What is forgotten here is that iconicity has a double directionality in
natural language towards the represented situation and the implied
world of the speaker, a feature absent in formal sign systems (which
is the very reason why they invented in the ﬁrst place, namely, to
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altogether).
Let me illustrate the claim that when deictic iconicity is left out you
tend to get an inappropriate picture. Take for example the signiﬁer
IMF (International Monetary Fund). Depending whether the speaker is
a politician from Japan, an investing country, or from Thailand, a
borrowing country, makes all the diﬀerence to the meaning of the term.
While both direct us to the same numerical phenomenon of the IMF, its
meaning changes from a benevolent, economically sound, and ultimately
beneﬁcial institution to one that is authoritative, causes economic and
political dependency, and ultimately prevents the receiving country from
establishing itself as an equal partner. Depending on the size of the
dictionary such meanings tend to be either short or elaborate texts. What
cannot be established, contrary to the analytical tradition of meaning, is
that there is a denotative, logical line where the deﬁnition of meaning
terminates and the elaboration of ‘signiﬁcance’ sets in.
Another one of Wittgenstein’s formulations which highlights the
diﬀerence between propositions and natural language sentences is that
while ‘a proposition shows its sense’ (4.022) a sentence typically reveals
its sense after we have invested interpretive labor. The reason for this is,
I suggest, once more that we are dealing here with diﬀerent kinds of sense,
deﬁnitional sense in the Tractatus, and natural language sense requir-
ing iconic elaboration as a necessary condition of meaning. Ironically,
many of the sentences in the Tractatus fall foul of Wittgenstein’s own
requirement. What his reassessment in the Philosophical Investigations
amounts to in the end is not merely a critique of the early picture theory
of language, but the radical and largely unexplored provision of the
missing iconic bedrock of natural language: Lebensform (Wittgenstein
1953: 23).
Iconicity, as Petrilli and Ponzio show persuasively, is of course no more
than shorthand for nonverbal signs in general. With reference to Sebeok
and the tradition of biosemiotics, the authors quote the work of Giorgio
Prodi and his assertion that nonverbal meaning construction ‘is at the
very root of all biological machines’ (p. 105). ‘Biology is pure natural
semiotics’ for Prodi, a claim that is compatible with the insistence in
recent cognitivist research on ‘mapping’ as the primary way by which both
human and nonhuman organisms relate to the environment. But what
is ‘mapping’ if not a general form of iconic sign production? And even
though such current research overemphasizes in my view the role of the
visual, there is no obvious reason why the principle of mapping should
not be a ﬁtting metaphor for gustatory, olfactory, and other nonvisual
readings.
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ogy, or between the Peircean sign systems and structuralist semiotics.
While Saussure’s early semiologie understood language as part of the
wider ﬁeld of signs and at the same time granted the signiﬁed the
important status of iconic image and concept, his successors gradually
allowed the signiﬁed to shrivel and reversed the relation between language
and signiﬁcation at large. In Lacan’s hands, the demise of the icon appears
in the equation of the signiﬁed with desire, something forever outside our
reach (a theory that makes it very diﬃcult for engineers to build an
air craft); in the hands of a more recent writer electronic monitors
have turned signiﬁeds into ‘ﬂickering signiﬁers’, a claim easily falsiﬁed
with the help of the word processor (Hayles 1993: 76). It remains puzzling
that structuralist semiotics should have so readily sacriﬁced to syntactic
independence the iconic relation by which we link language and world.
This is how structuralism has lost reference in principle and not only in its
positivist guise. Yet without reference, we have also lost the phenomenal
world, while language has turned into a prison without windows.
This is why Roland Barthes is so wrong when he claims that with
respect to verbal language nonverbal signs are parasitical (p. 140). It only
appears this way because we are so deeply embedded in language and
because language is such a powerful sign system in its competition with
nonverbal signiﬁcation as well as in its unique power of hierarchization.
Moreover, we have been brainwashed over the last century by the con-
certed onslaught of theorists addicted to extreme versions of the ‘linguistic
turn’. If anything, the opposite of Barthes’s position seems likely. Both
ontogenetically and phylogenetically, humans acquire language grad-
ually after they have already been ‘in touch’ with the world. Contrary
to Le ´ vi-Strauss, language most likely emerged in graded leaps as yet
another evolutionary phenomenon and as an eﬀective summary system
increasingly imposed on nonverbal signiﬁcation.
Long before the infant is able to recognize her mother’s linguistic
pleadings, is she able, with the help of her primeval limbic system and its
olfactory readings, to orient herself towards the breast. When the word
‘mummy’ (or its equivalents) is ﬁnally and consistently read by the child,
tactile, gustatory, nonlinguistic auditory and other nonverbal readings
have already successfully established a small world. ‘We think because
we smelled’, observes Diane Ackerman adroitly in A Natural History of
the Senses (1991: 20).
Are the color shades of green parasitic on the term? An iconic reversal
of structuralist fantasies is overdue. And if nonverbal signs are ﬁrst, then
(pace Barthes) language is parasitic on the nonverbal. Petrilli and Ponzio
make a signiﬁcant contribution to redress the structuralist imbalance by
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semiotic system, ‘plays the role of third party’; it mediates between a
language user and the object world (p. 141). To take the view that all
three, language user, object, as well as language are no more than
linguistic phenomena is not only logically untenable but founders in
interpretive practice on the rock of iconicity.
Once we acknowledge the importance of iconicity we have opened the
door to nonverbal signs in general. Throughout Signs of Research on
Signs the authors point to the advantages of such a broad view of
semiotics. They draw our attention to the early theorization of nonverbal
signs by Peirce for whom ‘some feeling, image, conception, or other
representation’ constituted a sign (p. 69). For Peirce, they remind us, the
body with the totality of its nonverbal forms of signiﬁcation ‘is a con-
dition for the full development of consciousness, such that the human
mind is ‘‘incarnated consciousness’’ ’ (p. 70). They discuss at length the
work of Thomas Sebeok, one of the gatekeepers of the ﬁeld, whose
writings have consistently oﬀered the view of a universe ‘perfused with
signs’ such that ‘‘‘the imperium of Nature, or Weltbuch, over Culture,
or Bu¨echerwelt, has always been unmistakable’’’ (p. 59). However, the
nonverbal signs of nature are by no means presented by Sebeok as
a barrier to the dominance of the verbal signs of culture; rather, the latter
is regarded as a biosemiotic continuum of the former. Human semiosis
has grown out of biosemiosis. Hence Sebeok’s revival of Uexku ¨ ll’s
Umweltlehre and his own brand of zoosemiotics as part of an all-
encompassing ‘doctrine of sings’ (p. 60). As Petrilli and Ponzio put it
succinctly, for Sebeok ‘the activity of interpreting coincides with the
activity of life’ (p. 63).
It seems to me that Sebeok is right to advocate the ‘autonomy of non-
verbal sign systems with respect to the verbal’ (p. 61). To argue the
inverse, as does Barthes, looks like a secular form of a theological
commitment to higher forms of signiﬁcation. Petrilli and Ponzio likewise
appear to endorse Sebeok’s stance. Where I suggest we need to go further
than Sebeok is on the question as to how precisely verbal meanings are
dependent on our nonverbal grasp of the world (Ruthrof 1997, 2000).
Sebeok is also shown to be making a signiﬁcant contribution to the
semiotics of deception (made famous be Umberto Eco, though there are
Italian precursors) by extending the argument for the capacity of lying
in the animal world. Anyone who has ever had a smart pet agrees with
him, of course. Deception, it turns out, is not restricted to the domain of
the verbal. This once again tells us that it is foolish to insist on drawing
lines between the capacities of humans and those of other organisms and
instead think in terms of evolutionary scales on which we can map speciﬁc
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speculative projections it seems the more likely they are to be supported
by future research.
The authors of Signs of Research on Signs part company with Sebeok
when he turns to the vision of a machinic future. What Sebeok believes
will be a transformation of semiosis as we know it into a new ‘life of
signs’, they regard as a dystopia, a threatening ‘nonlife’ and hence
‘an absence of signs’ (p. 68). I think Petrilli and Ponzio are blinkered here
by a humanistic ideology that unnecessarily sharpens the distinction
between human and machine. Consider the very gradual transition that
we are beginning to witness now, from machines and organic life toward
biorobotic assemblages; where the notion of ‘machine’ is as gradually
transformed as the conception of what is human; where a multitude of
synthetic body parts, digital implants, and pharmaceutical substitutes
increasingly turn humans into biomachines while at the same time
electronic machines are being transformed into bioelectronic organisms.
In such a biorobotic future, Sebeok’s speculations look far more likely
than Petrilli and Ponzio would have us believe.
According to Petrilli and Ponzio, iconicity is also an important ingre-
dient of the process of creativity, which in turn plays a central role
in signiﬁcation. At the center of the creative ‘mechanism’ of Peirce’s
semiotics stands the interpretant sign (deﬁned as a sign in which other
signs are more fully developed). As Petrilli and Ponzio put it, interpretants
result from ‘open-ended interpretive processes constituting the semiotic
material of the universe’. This is what Dewey is shown to get funda-
mentally wrong when he regards ‘the relation between sign and inter-
pretant as internal to the sign system’ a mistake oddly reminiscent of the
structuralist fallacy of the intersyntactical nature of linguistic meaning.
Petrilli and Ponzio rightly insist that ‘there is no such thing as a sign
without an interpretant or an interpreter, given that the interpretant is the
eﬀect of the sign on the interpreter’ (p. 84). They go on to explain Peirce’s
puzzling idea of the human being as a sign by saying that ‘since the
interpreter cannot exist as such if not as a modiﬁcation caused by the sign
in an open chain of interpretation, the interpreter is also an interpretant
and therefore a sign’ (p. 84).
The authors have also discovered a rudimentary theory of creativity
in the writings of Victoria Welby whose vision they characterize as
‘fundamentally organismic’ (p. 16) since for her sign and sense are
inextricably related to ‘an organism’s immediate, spontaneous reaction to
environmental stimuli’ (p. 16). Furthermore, she introduced a certain
creative randomness to semiotics by drawing our attention to ‘the expres-
sive plasticity and potential of signs and verbal language in particular
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‘the ‘‘plasticity’’ of language’ (p. 77) includes the observation that ‘words
and their contexts adapt to each other reciprocally, similarly to the
relationship between organisms and their environment’ (p. 16). This
reminds us not only of Uexku ¨ ll’s revolutionary Umweltlehre and Sebeok’s
longstanding interest in creativity in biosemiotics, but also of the more
recent research into creativity from the perspective of Maturana and
Varela’s autopoesis (Maturana and Varela 1980).
In Welby’s theory creativity is ﬁrmly linked with our ‘mother sense’
which, according to Petrilli and Ponzio, ‘corresponds to the capacity for
knowing in a broad and creative sense through sentiment, perception,
intuition, and cognitive leaps’ (p. 73). This creative ferment in our
psychological and intellectual makeup is reminiscent of Julia Kristeva’s
arguments for what she calls the semiotic, creative part of our subjectivity,
not yet controlled by the symbolic order (Kristeva 1986: 120–121)
explored more freely in her small, but insightful book In the Beginning
was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith (Kristeva 1987: 4–8). Love plays
a part also in Petrilli and Ponzio’s research where it is seen as
‘directed to the concrete, and not to abstractions, to persons’, where
‘love is a driving force’ linked with ‘iconicity, abduction, and creativity’
(pp. 74–75). This leads the authors to the kind of cosmic speculation
presented by Peirce in ‘The Law of Mind’ (1892) in which he suggests that
the entire cosmos, including the human mind, has evolved ‘through the
power of love understood as orientation to the other’ (p. 75).
A less convincing cosmic perspective can be found in Welby’s three
levels of consciousness, ‘planetary’, ‘solar’, and ‘cosmic’ (p. 17), which
she relates to three levels of ‘meaning’: sense, meaning, signiﬁcance.
Unfortunately, such partitions have only a superﬁcial attraction. The
scheme works quite well for strictly deﬁnitional sign systems: sense as
deﬁned, meaning as applied, signiﬁcance as what it amounts to socially.
Take a measuring tape for example. Its ‘sense’ could be pegged at the
level of 56 mm compared to 62 mm; ‘meaning’ could be the application
of sense so that the table length is measured say at 1 m and 120 mm; while
‘signiﬁcance’ could be argued to be the value of such measurements in
the order of a given culture. And superﬁcially it may appear that natural
language behaves likewise. The crucial diﬀerence however is that the
procedure here is reversed. What constitutes the sense or meaning of
a term such as ‘democracy’ is not determined a priori as for the measuring
tape, but a posteriori. First a culture speaks, and only then can we write
the grammars and dictionaries of its language. Furthermore, as I pointed
out earlier, sense here is always already both referential and deictic in a
general sense, a feature absent in the formal aspect of the measuring tape.
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one case because ‘Bakhtin, similarly to Welby, conceived the ﬂux of life as
a polyphonic interrelation of diﬀerences in continual transformation’
(p. 77), in another because of the attitude they take towards ‘the speciﬁcity
of human culture’ which for the Russian theorist ‘lies in its linguistic-
ideological value’ and for Welby in its ‘linguistic-psychological value’
(p. 77). For Bakhtin words themselves have an innate creative aspect,
‘their own ideological consistency and capacity for elaboration,’ (p. 78)
while ‘the inner psyche _ can only be understood and interpreted as a
sign’ (p. 79). Lastly, Welby is interested in the creative potential for
‘cultural regeneration’ (p. 80) not just in art but also in ‘slang and popular
talk’, which she regards as ‘reservoirs from which valuable currents might
be drawn into the main stream of language’ (p. 80). One might add here
that this is precisely what is happening now without guidance from the
traditional monitors of language.
Creativity is discussed once more by Petrilli and Ponzio, now from
the perspective of Peirce’s powerful tool of abduction. Contrary to recent
claims by some semioticians, Peirce was an astute and in many respects
faithful student of Kant’s Critiques, and not the least in his reworking
of Kant’s ‘reﬂective reason’ into ‘abduction’. As far as reasoning pro-
cedures go, this is the one that occupies center stage when it comes to
creative judgments. Just as Kant’s reﬂective-reason and dynamic-
interpretive frame, his non-Aristotelian telos, open the door for the
entire hermeneutic tradition, so too does ‘abduction’ introduce a
revolutionary interpretive principle to semiotics. Abductive interpretants
produce creative leaps. Petrilli and Ponzio rightly refer to abduction in
the context of the creativity of interpretation. Abduction, they observe,
‘is fundamental to play and fantasy’ as well as to the ‘practices of simu-
lation’ (p. 67). As such, abduction functions as an ‘inferential mechanism
allowing for the qualitative development of knowledge’ (p. 67).
Abduction, then, is a special series of interpretants that we might say
maximize interpretive freedom to produce new signs.
Ponzio applies these principles to a critique of Chomsky by showing
that ‘the relation between abduction and language learning _ is a
relation of reciprocal support’ (p. 118). This he develops into an
‘interpretive linguistic theory’, generalized to include nonverbal signiﬁca-
tion, in which utterances interact to form a web of interpretants. In this
perspective, the category of ‘identifying interpretant’ is juxtaposed to
that of the ‘answering comprehension interpretant’ to cater for linguistic
recognition, on the one hand, and creative, pragmatic application and
abductive extension, on the other (p. 119). Yet it is in literary language
that interpretation can be exercised most richly for reasons that Petrilli
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polyphony and the carnivalesque, where they identify a ‘philosophico-
moral ideal: responsibility as a participative-responsive attitude to the
truth of others’ as well as a dialogue with oneself (p. 27). Their reexam-
ination of the well-canvassed Bakhtinian notion of dialogism focuses on
‘the fact that one’s own word alludes always, despite itself, whether
it knows it or not, to the word of the other’. Rather than seeing dialogue
as a ‘synthesis of multiple viewpoints’ the authors emphasize the ethical
function of dialogue as ‘grounded in the responsibility without alibis for
the other’ (p. 27). This leads them to explore the theme of ‘otherness’.
It is only towards the end of Signs of Research on Signs that the reader
fully appreciates the reasons why Petrilli and Ponzio make so much of
the concept of the ‘other’. There is a deep conviction that ‘otherness’, in
conjunction with such notions as ‘polylogics’ and ‘answerability’, is an
essential part of human semiosis now threatened by digitally driven,
capitalist, global communication. What characterizes the way otherness
is argued in this book is the special combination of a number of con-
tributions from various ﬁelds of inquiry, in particular the Peircean
semiotic tradition, the philosophy of Le ´ vinas and the language theory of
Bakhtin. Emphasizing the other in their reading of Bakhtin, Petrilli and
Ponzio suggest that the language we employ is always already ‘dialogic
because of its passive involvement with the word of the other’ (p. 27). As a
result, dialogue is not to be seen as creating equality or symmetry, but
rather as an ethical negotiation of otherness, asymmetry, and refraction.
If this is the case, the authors contend, such inﬂuential readers of
Bakhtin as Holquist, Todorov, or Wellek ‘have fundamentally misunder-
stood the Bakhtinian concept of dialogue’ by presenting it in terms of
‘agreement, convergence, compromise [and] synthesis’ (p. 27). By con-
trast, Petrilli and Ponzio foreground the ethical task of ‘answering com-
prehension’ in Bakhtin’s texts. Central to this claim is their observation of
the eﬀect on the reader of the ‘impossibility of indiﬀerence toward the
other’ in Dostoyevsky’s dialogue (p. 28). This they link with Bakhtin’s
version of the endless chain of signs in the ‘unﬁnalizability of polyphonic
dialogue’ and his idea of deliberately incomplete ﬁctive personae (p. 30).
This theme is resumed in a section on Le ´ vinas to show once more that
otherness is best theorized as ‘located inside the subject’, a feature of
the ego itself. At the level of language the close relationship that Petrilli
and Ponzio forge between Bakhtin and Le ´ vinas allows them to highlight
the ‘internal dialogizaiton of the word’ and the doubling of concept and
reality, while from a moral perspective it allows them to remind us once
more of the challenge of ‘answerability’ (p. 51). While technical aspects
of signiﬁcation are important to their research, it becomes increasingly
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dimension of semiotics is at the heart of the authors’ concerns. For
them, ‘the self/other relation irreducibly supercedes the realm of knowl-
edge, of the concept, of abstract thought’, indeed ‘the latter are possible’
only as an eﬀect of that relation (p. 52). The ‘humanism of otherness’
that we ﬁnd in the work of Le ´ vinas is closely linked with the production
of art. It is here that the relation between the engaged artist and the
inevitable disengagement resulting from the publication of art play out,
in a special way, the relation between self and other. Art, Petrilli and
Ponzio point out, demonstrates our ‘irreversible movement toward the
other’ and ultimately the theme of ‘answerability’ (p. 53). By this they
do not mean any legal or moral standard but rather the subject’s task
of answering for the self in ‘individual answerability’ and the higher
achievement of ‘answerability for the other’ in artistic production
(p. 54).
There are a number of minor references to otherness later in the
book, of which the following are noteworthy. Linking the motif of the
‘other’ with Peirce and Welby, Petrilli and Ponzio suggest ‘that the logic
of otherness is an agapastic logic and that otherness, dialogicality, love
and abduction together constitute the generating nucleus of signs,
sense and worlds that are real, possible, or only imaginary’ (p. 75). In the
concluding attack on globalized communication Ponzio is quoted to
the eﬀect that ‘a critique of such a system presupposes the viewpoint of
another, which in turn presupposes recognition of the other, or better
still: recognition of the inevitable imposition and compulsoriness of
recognition of the other’ (p. 125). This reminds us of Kant’s second
principle of judgment, the rule of the enlarged horizon, itself thoroughly
dialogical, according to which we should always anticipate imaginatively
the possible objections that could be raised by our fellow citizens before
we proceed to judge.
Towards the end of the book the authors dedicate a few pages to the
discussion of silence and taciturnity. Silence is presented not merely in
terms of ‘ordinary modes of word suspension’ but as a special set of
nonverbal signs embedded in language (p. 140). Following the Peircean
scheme of symbolic, indexical, and iconic signs, Petrilli and Ponzio
elaborate silence as sign clusters in each of the three types. Symbolic signs
of silence include military silence, the silence of mourning, silence of
protest; indexical examples would be ‘silence as the eﬀect of fright,
surprise, suﬀocated anger, resentment’; while iconic signs of silence tend
to be an ‘expression of individual intentionality’ (p. 143). It is this latter
group that the authors also describe under the term ‘taciturnity’ as a sign
with powerful meaning potential and individualized engagement with the
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a standpoint with respect to the word of another’ (p. 144).
We have already had occasion to touch on ideology in several contexts.
However, ideology deserves a discussion in its own right, given the space
reserved for it by the authors. Instead of looking at ideology in terms
of the negative description of false consciousness, Petrilli and Ponzio
sympathize with Rossi-Landi’s post-Gramscian reading of ideology as
‘social programming’ (p. 35). Another approach to the question of
ideology that they discuss is that by Adam Schaﬀ who distinguishes
three types of deﬁnition: a genetic one addressing the evolution of the
concept; a structural deﬁnition which distinguishes between ideological
and other discourses; and a functional deﬁnition which looks at the
work that ideology performs in society. His functional deﬁnition describes
ideology as ‘a system of opinions related to social development founded
on a system of values’ (p. 49). This allows, somewhat naively, for his
distinction between ‘true ideologies’ and ‘ideologies as distortions of
reality’ (p. 51).
Rossi-Landi’s perspective on ideology looks a little more sophisticated
and it is therefore not surprising that Petrilli and Ponzio’s sympathies
lie with his research, which combines the doctrine of ideology with
semiotics as a necessary mediation. Vice versa, he relegates semiotics
‘unsupported by a doctrine of ideologies’ to a ‘specialized science,
detached from praxis’ (p. 35). Semiotics without a theory of social
praxis, according to Rossi-Landi, lacks a number of important ﬁelds of
inquiry, without which social reality as a totality cannot be analyzed.
One such ﬁeld is the description of the ‘class that owns the control of
the emission and circulation of verbal and nonverbal messages con-
stituting a given community’ (p. 36), another is the exteriority of material
production in relation to ‘semiological glottocentrism’ (p. 37). A descrip-
tion of the totality of social reality that he deﬁnes in Marxian terms as
‘the alienated human condition’ and as such a ‘malfunction in the for-
mation and the unfolding of history’ (p. 39) requires an ‘antiseparatist
and reconstructive’ approach, a ‘homological method’ by which we can
identify ‘resemblances of a structural and genetic order between objects
considered as separate and associated with diﬀerent ﬁelds of knowledge’
(p. 38). For Rossi-Landi the two crucial components of the totality
of the social are thought and praxis. They produce the double face of
ideology as false ‘discursive rationalization’ (p. 39) and ‘false praxis’
(p. 40), which together constitute social programming, the task of
humanistic critique.
Such a critique is spelled out clearly towards the end of the book where
global communication and its special European variety are the focus.
412 H. RuthrofWhat Heidegger regarded as essential for leading a poetically thought-
ful life within the constraints of our Being-towards-Death appears to
stand in radical opposition to the mechanisms of global communicat-
ion today. Although Petrilli and Ponzio do not refer to Heidegger and
while their vocabulary and style of reasoning belongs to a diﬀerent order,
the motivation for sharing the unease towards a ‘reinforced unity in the
European community’ (p. 145) based on a mainly economic rationale and
digital communication principles is not entirely incompatible with older
principles of humanism. In particular, they warn against such features
as the new stereotype of the ‘extra-communitarian’ (p. 145) that works
as a rule of exclusion covering ‘Algerians, Philippine house maids, black
street vendors, and most non-European people’ who try in vain to be
integrated into the new world of Europe (p. 145).
The European Union global communication, the authors suggest, has
created a new ideology of ‘social planning’ on the basis of three factors:
a social program deﬁned as ‘the development of capital’, the ‘European
Commission’ as capitalist control center, and the absence of any eﬀective
opposition (p. 147). As a result, Europe is now faced with ‘the monotony
of a single viewpoint’ summed up ambivalently under the ‘order word’
(as Deleuze and Guattari would put it) of ‘democracy’ (p. 147). Further
eﬀects of this new unitary constellation are such phenomena as politicians
turned ‘technicians’, voters clustered into ‘clientelism’, and corporativism,
‘indiﬀerent diﬀerence’, ‘migration’, the promotion of technical progress
not only by science and technology but increasingly also by the ‘human
sciences’. What Petrilli and Ponzio deplore in all this is the loss of what it
means to be human, ‘the sense of man’ (pp. 148–149).
Signs of Research on Signs concludes with an analysis of the deep
grammar of global communication and the possibility of critique. Rather
than investigating the logical mechanisms of the digital that makes the
entire monitoring mechanism function at high speed and unprecedented
eﬃciency, the authors reintroduce an older style of analysis with the
emphasis on ideology and the nature of capital. At the center of global
communication Petrilli and Ponzio observe a certain transformation of
the way capital is owned. ‘Capital must now be speciﬁed in terms of
communication control’ (p. 151). Today ‘production is communication’
such that all communication programs ﬁt within a ‘single global project’
(p. 151). Combined with ‘monologic communication oriented toward
a single, dominant viewpoint’ this results in the ‘reproduction of the
Same’ (p. 151). Both the tendency towards monolingualism and lin-
guistic imperialism are argued to follow from the ideal of high-speed
communication, which ultimately threatens the ‘human semiosic universe’
(p. 152).
The interpretive route 413How can we defend ourselves against what Calvino terms the ‘loss
of cognitive force and immediacy’ in the use of language? (p. 152). The
authors’ reference to Calvino is anything but gratuitous in this context
since their own recipe for resistance is in agreement with his sentiment
that ‘literature (and perhaps literature alone) can create antibodies’
against cultural homogenization (p. 153). Literature with its ‘allusive,
parodic, ironic silence, this form of laughter’, the place where we ﬁnd the
free ‘play of musement’ is oﬀered as an escape from digitized
communication control (p. 156). Especially literary writing in the form
of ‘storytelling’, another one of Petrilli and Ponzio’s ongoing research
projects, is presented as an eﬀective critical, global tradition, ‘a sort
of connective tissue throughout the centuries allowing for the circula-
tion of common themes, subjects, values, and discourse genres’ and
providing ‘a space for reﬂection, critical re-thinking, dialogue, encounter,
hospitality’ (pp. 156–157).
Certainly, Signs of Research on Signs itself oﬀers such hospitality and
a rich palette of argument and bibliographic materials not only for those
interested in the development of semiotics in Italy but generally as a useful
and challenging addition to the tradition of Peircean thought.
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